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The time has come for lawyers to confront the question of whether
nuclear weapons-their manufacture, deployment, and use-can be
justified under either constitutional or international law.
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Introduction
The time has come for lawyers to confront the question of whether
nuclear weapons-their manufacture, deployment, and use-can be
justified under either constitutional or international law. Since the ex-
plosions of primitive atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945
it has been assumed, without much thought, that there is nothing un-
lawful about those weapons. This paper is a preliminary statement that
suggests the contrary. It is predicated on two observations of Alfred
North Whitehead: "The doctrines which best repay critical examina-
tions are those which for the longest period have remained unques-
tioned;" 1 and "almost all really new ideas have a certain aspect of fool-
ishness when they are first presented."2 What follows is a brief outline
in which I contend that it is not really foolish for law and lawyers to
contribute to the growing debate about nuclear war.
People throughout the world live today under the threat of a nu-
clear arms "race" that is madly out of control. That peril has at long
last-almost forty years after the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki-percolated into the thinking of growing numbers of men
and women who have swelled into a spontaneous popular movement
against the ultimate danger. Their motivations, as perceived by Ambas-
sador George Kennan, include:
* Leo Goodwin, Sr., Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Center for the
Study of Law, Nova University; Professor Emeritus of Law, George Washington Uni-
versity. This essay is based on the author's work in progress, a book tentatively entitled
GETTING THERE FROM HERE: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FOR A SUSTAINABLE
SOCIETY.
1. Whitehead, as quoted in Miller, A Note on the Criticism of Supreme Court
Decisions, 10 J. PUB. L. 139 (1961).
2. Whitehead, as quoted in A. BRECHT, POLITICAL THEORY: THE FOUNDATIONS
OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT 262 (1959) (paperback ed. 1967).
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a growing appreciation by many people of the true horrors of a
nuclear war; a determination not to see their children deprived of
life, or their civilization destroyed, by a holocaust of this nature;
and finally . ., a very real exasperation with their governments
for the rigidity and traditionalism that cause those governments to
ignore the fundamental distinction between conventional weapons
and weapons of mass destruction and prevents them from finding,
or even seriously seeking, ways of escape from the fearful trap into
which the cultivation of nuclear weapons is leading us.3
Members of the clergy, physicians, scientists, and businessmen have
grasped and sought to show to others the meaning of nuclear war.
With rare exceptions, lawyers until very recent times have been
mute. They have assumed, if they thought about it, that nuclear weap-
ons are just another means of killing-a bit more powerful but not es-
sentially different from the long bow, the machine gun, the tank, and
the airplane. That assumption is simply not accurate.
Some lawyers, mainly those in international law, have begun to
challenge the assumption of legality of nuclear weaponry. The Lawyers
Committee on Nuclear Policy has recently been formed, with head-
quarters in New York City. The Committee's position is that nuclear
weapons are incompatible "with the core precepts of international
law." 4 The Committee believes that "nuclear warfare would lead to re-
sults incompatible with fundamental rules of international law, elemen-
tary morality, and contrary to any rational conception of national inter-
est and world order. . . . The very nature of nuclear warfare is
destructive of all the values which law obligates us to preserve." 5
3. Kennan, On Nuclear War, THE N.Y. REVIEW, Jan. 21, 1982, at 8. See Mo-
lander, How I Learned to Start Worrying About Nukes, Manchester Guardian
Weekly, April 4, 1982, at 17 (reprint from the Washington Post). For the view of
physicians, see Kerzner, The Last Epidemic, Miami Herald, March 7, 1982, at El, col.
1 where it states, "Nuclear war could be the last epidemic our civilization will know.
Hundreds of millions of people would be killed or injured, and the economic, ecological
and social fabric on which human life depends would be shattered."
4. Weston, Clergy, Doctors, Business-and now the Lawyers, Des Moines Regis-
ter, March 27, 1982, at A9, col. 1. Professor Weston of the University of Iowa quotes
Chicago banker Ervin Salk to the effect that the nuclear arms race "is tearing the guts
out of our economy just like Vietnam did."
5. LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR POLICY, STATEMENT ON THE ILLEGALITY
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 7 (undated). The Committee's purpose is to initiate a dialogue
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No one has yet asked the constitutional question: Does the manu-
facture, deployment, and "possible-even probable-use of nuclear
weapons contravene the Constitution? This paper is a preliminary in-
quiry into that question. It is an outline, presenting possible constitu-
tional arguments, rather than a full-dress exposition. In the well-known
but little heeded words of Albert Einstein, "the unleashed power of the
atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and we thus
drift toward unparalleled catastrophe."' So we do: I contend in this
brief paper that the time has come-indeed, it is long past-to change
"our modes of thinking" about the constitutionality of nuclear
weapons.
My conclusion may be simply stated: An argument based on the
goal-seeking nature of constitutionalism, together with at least four
other constitutional arguments, invalidate the presumption of constitu-
tionality. These arguments will be discussed in detail later. This is not
to say that the Supreme Court would sustain these arguments, were a
case to be brought. Rather, it is to say that as a part of the dialogue
that is beginning about the legality of nuclear weapons the dimension
of constitutional law cannot be ignored-it is not enough to argue that
those weapons are incompatible with international law-as surely they
are.
At the outset, I readily concede the jurisprudential problem of
whether legal norms (rights) can exist absent a means of enforcement.
That, however, should not stay the inquiry into the relevance of consti-
tutional prescriptions to the nuclear threat. As long ago as 1803, in the
famous case of Marbury v. Madison7 that established the Supreme
Court's power of judicial review, Chief Justice John Marshall acknowl-
edged that Mr. Marbury was entitled to his commission as a justice of
the peace but went on to assert that there could be no judicial enforce-
ment of that right. Congress, Marshall held, had constitutionally erred
in trying to enlarge upon the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. Furthermore, until recent decades, a number of now-recognized
regarding the legitimacy of nuclear weapons under international law. (The present es-
say seeks to expand that focus to encompass constitutional law.) The Committee's ad-
dress is 777 United Nations Plaza (5th Floor), New York, N.Y. 10017. (In the inter-
ests of disclosure, I am a member of the Consultative Council of the Committee.)
6. J. SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH 188 (1982).
7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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constitutional rights such as the right to privacy, one person/one vote,
and racial desegregation were not given judicial cognizance. The his-
tory of American constitutional law is one of an expanding number of
rights brought into being, in one way or another, by the Supreme Court
or other constitutional decisionmakers. In philosophic terms,
law-including constitutional law-has always been instrumental.
Rather than being a fixed body of pre-existing immutable principles, it
is goal-seeking, purposive-a type of human activity that exists for
identifiable ends. In addition, constitutional law has been and is relative
to circumstances. Necessity is the mother of constitutional law which is
constantly in a state of "becoming. '"8
More than 40,000 nuclear weapons now exist, and more are being
produced each week. Russia has enough to wipe out every American
city of 1500 or more people. The United States has an even larger
stockpile. And nuclear capacity is proliferating. France, Great Britain,
India, China, for certain, and Israel, South Africa and perhaps Brazil
also have significant nuclear weaponry. Enough "overkill" already ex-
ists in amounts sufficient to vaporize every living human being on earth
today. And yet political officers in the world's capitals continue a mad
"race" for supremacy.
This essay is emphatically not a plea for unilateral disarmament.
We live in a Hobbesian world, a condition not at all likely to change.
The essence of my argument is that those who wield both formal au-
thority and effective control in the American constitutional order have
a duty to take action designed to eliminate the nuclear threat through-
out the world. The duty, I maintain, is of constitutional dimension. The
ultimate goal has been stated recently by Billy Graham as the elimina-
tion of every weapon of mass destruction in the world.
The Philosophical Basis of Constitutionalism
The text of the ensuing discussion comes from Justice Felix Frank-
furter and the French legal philosopher, Leon Duguit. Said Frankfurter
in 1949: "It is of the very nature of a free society to advance in its
8. For discussion, see A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT
CONSTITUTION OF CONTROL (1981); A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL Ac-
TIVISM: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1982).
24 Nova Law Journal 7:1982 1
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standards of what is deemed reasonable and right."9 Said Duguit in
1919: "Any system of public law can be vital only so far as it is based
on a given sanction to the following rules: First, the holders of power
cannot do certain things; second, there are certain things they must
do."10
This, then, is an exercise in American constitutionalism. As a con-
cept, constitutionalism has usually had, at least in the United States, a
normative connotation, as witness the following definitions. "Constitu-
tionalism," Friedrich Hayek maintains,
means that all power rests on the understanding that it will be ex-
ercised in accordance with commonly accepted principles, that the
persons on whom power is conferred are selected because it is
thought that they are most likely to do what is right, not in order
that whatever they do should be right."
To Daniel Bell it is "the common respect for the framework of law, and
acceptance of outcomes under due process."1 2 Walter F. Murphy main-
tains that "[t]he fundamental value that constitutionalism protects is
human dignity." ' And to Charles McIlwain "constitutionalism has one
essential quality: it is a legal limitation on government."14 In sum, con-
stitutionalism in America is more than a process-more than procedure
alone-but has a substantive, normative, content looking toward the
responsibility, as McIlwain put it, of government to the governed.
James Madison said it well in The Federalist No. 51: "In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control
the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."15
As "officers of the courts" lawyers have a quasi-governmental sta-
9. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
10. L. DUGUIT, LAw IN THE MODERN STATE 26 (H. Laski trans. 1919).
11. F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 181 (1960).
12. Bell, The End of American Exceptionalism, 41 PUB. INTEREST 193 (1975).
13. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 758
(1980).
14. C. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 21 (rev. ed.
1947). Mcllwain also said: "All constitutional government is by definition limited gov-
ernment." Id.
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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tus. As such, they should no longer remain on the sidelines, taking no
action to seek and, one hopes, to find what Kennan calls "ways of es-
cape." 16 The full force of law, feeble though it may be, should be
brought to bear upon the growing peril. Law, to be sure, has shortcom-
ings as a principle of social order. It cannot do everything; there are
limits to its effectiveness in changing either the attitudes or behavior of
people. But that does not mean that the effort should not be made.
Chief Justice Earl Warren once remarked that "law floats in a sea of
ethics."117 So it does: law can be a powerful educational force that will
create the climate so necessary to move away from the abyss.
A persuasive case can be made for the proposition that nuclear
weapons should be considered to be unlawful under both international
law and constitutional law. Since law is instrumental, and a reflection
of the circumstances in which it exists, the nuclear peril presents it
with a challenge and an opportunity. In the United States, the ultimate
purpose of law is human survival under conditions that allow human
dignity to be maximized. In familiar legal terms, nuclear weapons are a
clear and present danger both to survival and especially to achievement
of human dignity. Senator J. W. Fulbright, then chairman of the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee, stated the point in 1967 in these
well-chosen words: The President, he said,
by acquiring the authority to commit the country to war, now exer-
cises something approaching absolute power over the life or death
of every American-to say nothing of millions of other people all
over the world. . . . No human being or group [is] wise and com-
petent enough to be entrusted with such vast power. Plenary pow-
ers in the hand of any man or group threatens all other men with
tyranny or disaster. 18
So it does-whether such a power resides in the Kremlin or the White
House. The well-known statement of military scientist Karl von Clause-
16. See Kennan, supra note 3, at 8.
17. Address by Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court
at the Louis Marshall Award Dinner of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America
in New York City (Nov. 11, 1962).
18. Fried, War-Exclusive and War-Inclusive Style in International Conduct, 11
TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 26 (1976) (quoting from S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 1,
26 (1967)).
7:19821
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witz, that "war is diplomacy carried on by other means,"1 9 may well
have been accurate when made early in the nineteenth century; but it
no longer is. Unleashing the atom invalidated it.
Nuclear war cannot by any criterion be "deemed reasonable and
right"--to use Justice Frankfurter's words. Not for the United States.
Not for the Soviet Union. Nor for any nation. International law merges
with constitutional law to proscribe use of such weapons. Once that is
seen, afortiori their manufacture and deployment are also outlawed.
Constitutional Challenges to Nuclear Weapons: The Goals of
the Preamble
The purposive-goal-seeking-dimension of constitutionalism sug-
gests this argument: the preamble to the Constitution states the ends of
government--"to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure
domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the gen-
eral welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity." Nuclear weapons and the delicate balance of terror jeopard-
ize each of those goals; and nuclear war would eradicate them. Surely
the framers could not have contemplated such a consequence either for
themselves or their posterity.
We are that posterity. The time has come to think seriously about
giving substantive content to the preamble. Strictly speaking, to be
sure, the preamble is not part of the Constitution. It precedes it. The
preamble has never been held to sustain a specific claim of governmen-
tal power or of private right. As Justice Joseph Story said in his Com-
mentaries, "Its true office is to expound the nature and extent and ap-
plication of the powers actually conferred by the Constitution, and not
substantively to create them."20 In other words, the preamble sets the
tone for the meanings to be given to the specific provisions of the Docu-
ment of 1787.
Those meanings, first, should be derived from a correct apprecia-
tion of present conditions and with the avowed goal of meeting current
problems. To quote Chief Justice Marshall's well-known words in Mc-
19. K. VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR - (J. Graham trans., F. Maude ed. 1968).
20. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION bk. 3, § 462, at 361 (5th
ed. 1981) (1st ed. 1833).
27 1
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Culloch v. Maryland, "The subject is the execution of those great pow-
ers on which the welfare of a nation essentially depends. . . .This pro-
vision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come,
and, consequently, to be adapted to the various 'crises' of human af-
fairs. '21 The import of that statement, the most important ever uttered
on the theory of constitutional interpretation, is clear: The Constitution
may validly be considered to be a tacit delegation of power by the
framers to enable succeeding generations of Americans to write their
own fundamental law-to meet, that is, the exigencies of their-not
the framers'-times.
The Constitution was drafted for the benefit of "ourselves and our
posterity." Since nuclear weapons threaten the goals of the preamble,
the meaning is that there will be no posterity left to pick up the pieces
after the bombs have exploded. Not only will the constitutional order
have vanished, but quite possibly civilization itself. No one can validly
argue that threatening the very existence of "posterity" can be consti-
tutional. Posterity has its claims under the Constitution. That is partic-
ularly true because the rapid rate of social change, brought about by
the scientific-technological revolution, means that most people alive to-
day will be their own posterity. (Those who ask, "what has posterity
done for me?", should constantly keep in mind that they are their own
posterity.)
I do not suggest, of course, that in and of itself the preamble can
be invoked to persuade anyone that nuclear weapons are unconstitu-
tional per se. However, the preamble does provide an initial entry point
into a more detailed and more specific analysis. The implication here is
that, as William Seward once said, "there is a higher law than the
Constitution"; or as Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Fletcher v. Peck,22
Georgia's attempt to revoke a fraudulent land grant disregarded "cer-
tain great principles of natural justice. '2 Therefore, Georgia was re-
strained "either by general principles which are common to our free
21. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 216, 421 (1819). See E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION
AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 2 (A. Chase & C. Ducat 13th ed. 1973) where it states,
"the Constitution. . .should be interpreted in the light of present conditions and with
a view to meeting present problems."
22. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
23. Id. at 133.
!
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institutions, or by the particular provisions of the Constitution. 24 Mar-
shall's colleague, Justice William Johnson, went even further, asserting
that "a general principle, on the reason and nature of things; a princi-
ple which will impose laws even on the deity"2 5 invalidated the at-
tempted rescission. In sum, can a principle of natural justice-a con-
cept that has greater currency in Great Britain-be employed to
determine the validity of nuclear weapons? The answer can only be
"yes." In the language of the famous "Martens Clause" of the fourth
Hague Convention of 1907, when no treaty provision specifically for-
bids a new tactic or weapon, combatants and non-combatants remain
nonetheless protected by legal principles derived "from the usages es-
tablished among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the
dictates of the public conscience. '"28
Without going further into the complex question of natural justice,
what particular provisions of the Constitution are conceivably relevant
to the nuclear weapons situation? I suggest the following, each of
which would require creativity or innovation by a constitutional deci-
sion-maker. The points are listed as questions requiring exploration, not
as established doctrines. Taken together, however, they point in only
one direction: the illegality of nuclear weapons.
The Congressional War Power
First: Can Congress delegate, tacitly or expressly, its war-making
power? That there has been a tacit delegation to the President admits
of no doubt (as Senator Fulbright said). It is even possible to perceive
an express delegation in the War Powers Resolution of 1973, enacted
into law over President Richard Nixon's veto, which ironically was in-
tended to place limits over presidential power.2¢
Presidents beginning with George Washington have unilaterally
employed -violence. All of those instances, however, save perhaps for
24. Id. at 139.
25. Id. at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring).
26. 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 309 (L. Friedman ed.
1972); R. FALK, L. MEYROWITZ, & J. SANDERSON, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 15 (Occasional Paper No. 10, World Order Studies Program, Center
of International Studies, Princeton University (1981)).
27. See Fried, supra note 18.
29 1
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President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, were for limited
goals. They were taken in accordance with the Principle of the Econ-
omy of Means: just enough violence to meet the situation adequately.28
That Principle is simply not applicable in the age of nuclear warfare.
By definition, use of nuclear weapons cannot be limited. Once em-
ployed, sooner or later the conflict will escalate into all-out war. The
meaning for present purposes is that it is one thing for a President to
use limited violence, but that it is quite another thing for the Chief
Executive to have absolute power of life and death in the nuclear age.
Insofar as there is a constitutional doctrine about delegation of legisla-
tive powers, certainly it does not extend to the power to threaten civili-
zation itself.
During the Civil War, the Supreme Court in the Prize Cases2"
sustained Lincoln's actions to meet the emergency: "The President was
bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for
Congress to baptize it with a name, and no name given to it by him or
them could change the fact."30 (What the Court did not say was that
Lincoln made absolutely no attempt to call Congress into session to
consider a response to Fort Sumter's hostilities; in fact, he waited al-
most three months-from April until July-before formally telling
Congress what was going on.) The most that can be said for the deci-
sion in the Prize Cases is that the Supreme Court came close to being
an arm of the Executive. That decision, furthermore, at best stands for
the proposition that a President can respond to emergency situations.
By no means does it mean that the President can commence a war.
First-strike use of nuclear weapons should, as former high officials
Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Gerard Smith and George Ken-
nan recently argued in Foreign Affairs, be dropped as a policy option.31
The so-called doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, taken pursuant
to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, was cited by American
lawyers during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 (wrongly, in my judg-
ment). That episode is proof positive about the enormity of Congress
28. For discussion, see A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT
CONSTITUTION OF CONTROL (1981).
29. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
30. Id. at 699.
31. McNamara, Bundy, Smith & Kennan, Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic
Alliance, 60 FOREIGN Arr. 753 (Spring 1982).
30 Nova Law Journal
7:19821
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allowing one man to have the power to eliminate human life. Clearly,
the framers did not want the wealth and blood of the nation to be com-
mitted by one person (as The Federalist No. 69 evidences)-even in a
day before the invention of such conventional weapons as the machine
gun and the tank! During the 1787 Convention, Elbridge Gerry re-
marked that he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to em-
power the President alone to declare war."32
We deal, however, with one of the greatest silences of the Consti-
tution; the principle of constitutional reason of State (raison d'etat),
defined as "the doctrine that whatever is required to insure the survival
of the State must be done by the individuals responsible for it, no mat-
ter how repugnant such an act may be to them in their private capacity
as decent and moral men. '13 3 Political officers of American government
have never hesitated to employ that principle-to invoke a constitu-
tional silence-both in external and wholly domestic matter, when they
believed that conditions warranted. Franz Neumann put it well:
No society in recorded history has ever been able to dispense with
political power. This is as true of liberalism as of absolutism, as
true of laissez faire as of an interventionist state. No greater disser-
vice has been rendered to political science than the statement that
the liberal state was a "weak" state. It was precisely as strong as it
needed to be in the circumstances. It acquired substantial colonial
empires, waged wars, held down internal disorders, and stabilized
itself over long periods of time.34
Neumann surely was correct on the historical record. Said another
way, the Constitution has never been a barrier to what those who wield
effective control over governmental actions wanted to do.
Circumstances have changed so radically since 1787, and even
since the first primitive atom bombs were exploded in 1945, that old
practices and old modes of thinking about constitutional propriety must
be re-examined. New doctrine must be discovered: The government
32. 2 M. FARRAND: THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
318 (1911).
33. C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE 4-5 (1957).
34. F. NEUMANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 8 (1957).
See Miller, Reason of State and the Emergent Constitution of Control, 64 MiNN. L.
REv. 585 (1980).
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must be obliged, as Madison said, to control itself.3 5
The Bill of Rights was a conscious attempt to resolve the dilemma
that raison d'etat presented to policy-makers. The first ten amendments
were inserted for the people's security, to counterbalance extravagant
claims of State security. The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were
not naive. They knew history and they knew the dark side of man.
They opted to make "reasons of freedom and of personal security" ex-
plicit, leaving "reason of state" unexpressed. Nuclear warfare means
that both personal and national security are threatened; neither can
long exist while nuclear weapons proliferate. To permit the President
alone to have the power to trigger thermonuclear war is contrary both
to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. The failure of Congress
to retrieve its war-making authority can no longer be tolerated. In fact,
the power to commit the nation to nuclear war is not only presidential;
it has actually been delegated to subordinate officers-and on a number
of occasions to the vagaries of a computer interpreting radar messages.
That is an intolerable situation.
The Congressional Power to Punish Offenses
Second: Can Congress neglect to exercise a delegated power? We
have already mentioned the war-making power. Under article I, section
8, clause 10 of the Constitution, Congress has power to punish offenses
against "the law of nations." In his famous Commentaries on Ameri-
can Law, Chancellor Kent wrote in 1826:
"When the United States ceased to be a part of the British empire,
and assumed the character of an independent nation, they became
subject to that system of rules which reason, morality, and custom
had established among civilized nations of Europe, as their public
law .... The faithful observance of this law is essential to na-
tional character. ... 6
If, then, it can be shown that international law makes nuclear
weaponry illegal, a duty is imposed upon the United States (and other
nations) to adhere to that principle.
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
36. J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1 (1826).
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The argument would go like this: Congress having been delegated
the power to define and punish offenses against international law, has a
duty to carry out that power. In United States v. Arjona,37 the Su-
preme Court said that international law places a duty on every govern-
ment to prevent a wrong being done within its borders to another na-
tion with which it is at peace, or to the people thereof. That of course is
scant legal authority, as lawyers understand authority, to sustain an
argument that Congress has a duty to determine the state of interna-
tional legal norms concerning nuclear warfare and act in pursuance
thereof. But the Arjona decision does provide a point of entry into a
systematic inquiry into the problem. Richard Falk and colleagues have
concluded in their monograph Nuclear Weapons and International
Law that "any threat or contemplated use of nuclear weapons is con-
trary to the dictates of international law and constitutes a crime of
state."3 8 If that be so, then the duty that American government has, in
all of its branches, becomes clear: to take action to help prevent that
"crime of state." As the United Nations has repeatedly said, the threat
or use of nuclear weapons is a "crime against mankind and
civilization. 39
The Constitution and International Law
Third: Is international law a part of the corpus of "laws" that the
President must faithfully execute (pursuant to Article II of the Consti-
tution)? No one has ever fully explicated the meaning of the word
"laws". Usually it is thought of as Congressional statutes. Arguably,
however, it has a wider compass. For example, in recent years the Su-
preme Court has maintained, successfully, that its decisions are the law
37. 120 U.S. 479 (1887). The Arjona principle was employed by the Supreme
Court to hold that Congress may set up a military commission "as it had previously
existed in United States Army practice, as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and
punishment of offenses against the law of war." In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946);
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). Compare A. REEL, THE CASE OF GENERAL
YAmASHITA (1949) with T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN
TRAGEDY (1970).
38. See supra note 26, at 60.
39. G.A. Res. 1653, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1961).
331
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of the land4°--thus presenting the question of whether the President
has a constitutional duty to faithfully execute them. That question is
not only unanswered in constitutional theory; it is little discussed in the
scholarly literature. If, however, the Supreme Court is correct in its
perception of the thrust of its decisions, then the word "laws" must
include more than Congressional enactments. If that is so for the Su-
preme Court, it requires no large mental jump to say the same for
norms of "the law of nations."
Imposing duties upon the President is such a new concept that
very few judicial decisions are apposite. Since Mississippi v. Johnson,"1
it was thought that the writ of courts did not run against the Chief
Executive. That, however, changed in 1974 when President Nixon was
required to relinquish the infamous White House tapes.42 Lawsuits
against the President have become, if not routine, then certainly not
rare.43 (Even so, litigants tend to hale subordinate executive officers
into court, rather than the Chief Executive--as, for example, in the
Iranian Hostage Case."
A concept of constitutional duty is slowly being developed in
American constitutional law. Since Cooper v. Aaron,5 the Justices
have maintained that their decisions are "the law of the land." The
Justices have more than an umpire's function, as Justice William Bren-
nan noted:
Under our system, judges are not mere umpires, but, in their own
sphere, lawmakers-a coordinate branch of government. While in-
dividual cases turn upon controversies between parties, or involve
particular prosecutions, court rulings impose official and practical
40. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
41. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
42. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
43. E.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Goldwater v. Carter, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded,
444 U.S. 996 (1979). See generally STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT IDENTIFYING COURT PROCEEDINGS AND ACTIONS OF
VITAL INTEREST TO THE CONGRESS 11 (Comm. Print 1981).
44. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (Regan is the current Sec-
retary of the Treasury). See Miller, Dames & Moore v. Regan: A Political Decision by
a Political Court, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1104 (1982).
45. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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consequences upon members of society at large. Moreover, judges
bear responsibility for the vitally important task of construing and
securing constitutional rights ...
The interpretation and application of constitutional and statu-
tory law, while not legislation, is lawmaking, albeit of a kind that is
subject to special constraints and informed by unique considera-
tions. Guided and confined by the Constitution and pertinent stat-
utes, judges are obliged to be discerning, to exercise judgment, and
to prescribe rules. Indeed, at times judges wield considerable au-
thority to formulate legal policy in designated areas.4"
My suggestion is that Supreme Court Justices should grasp the nettle
and point out to the Executive and the Congress that officials in those
branches are charged with a constitutional duty to take action to elimi-
nate threats to the lives, liberties, and properties of the citizenry. Those
threats emanate from nuclear weaponry.
The Affirmative Duties of the Federal Government
Fourth: That suggestion of a pervasive governmental duty runs not
only to the express provision that the President must faithfully execute
the laws but to Congress as well to define and deal with the law of
nations and also to the Supreme Court-to make international legal
norms judicially cognizable. Of even more importance, a due process
question is presented: Does due process of law have a third dimen-
sion-in addition to its procedural and substative aspects-that places
affirmative duties upon the federal government?
The answer can only be "yes." Some Supreme Court decisions
point in that direction. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish"" for exam-
ple, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote for the Court that "the
liberty safeguarded. . .(by the Constitution) is liberty in a social or-
ganization which requires the protection of law against the evils which
menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people.148 That
statement seems to fit the nuclear weapons situation exactly. And in
46. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 & n.20 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
47. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
48. Id. at 391 (emphasis added).
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Green v. County School Board of Kent,49 the court held that local
school boards were "charged with the affirmative duty"50 to integrate
public schools. Professor Thomas Emerson has argued that the first
amendment has an affirmative dimension.5 1 The point is that American
constitutional law should include not only what governments can and
cannot do but also, as Duguit said, 52 what they must do if constitution-
alism is to survive; and there is precedent for that conclusion.
The argument, in sum, is that the Constitution imposes duties and
obligations upon government to control itself-and thus to protect the
citizenry. Those obligations run to the American people-the "We, the
people . . ." of the preamble. They can be inferred from the Constitu-
tion itself, from certain statutes, and from some Supreme Court deci-
sions. The emergent duty that should be recognized is for government
officers not to take actions that jeopardize the well-being of the popu-
lace, or the well-being of "posterity," or indeed, the well-being of peo-
ples of other nations. Nuclear weapons so endanger the lives, liberties,
and property of all Americans that they should be considered to be a
deprivation contrary to due process.
Conclusion
It would be naive to expect the Supreme Court to intervene in
matters such as are discussed above. In general, judges are timorous
officers of government. They look upon requests to go beyond the famil-
iar and the expected as "frightful occasions."53 Judges, however, are
not the only guardians of the Constitution. Their reluctance should not
foreclose a growing dialogue about the constitutionality of nuclear
weapons. Constitutional lawyers and political scientists can no longer
remain aloof from the ultimate terror. Political means must be invented
by which "the world can peacefully settle the issues that throughout
49. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
50. Id. at 437.
51. Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795
(1981).
52. See supra note 10.
53. See J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964), particularly at 101-02. See also J. STONE,
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE (1966).
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history it has settled by war.'" That is the challenge that nuclear
weapons presents to the constitutional lawyer. No more important task
exists.
54. J. SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE.EARTH 227 (1982).
17
Miller: Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
